Molnupiravir Armageddon

Leo Goldstein

Abstract
Merck's Molnupiravir is a global catastrophic risk. Its wide-spread use as a treatment for COVID-19 will create dangerous variants of SARS-COV-2. It is already in use in some countries.

Molnupiravir (“MOLN”), a presumed anti-COVID19 drug, acts by significantly increasing the error rate in the coronavirus replication. In accordance with the Poisson distribution, that disproportionately increases the probability of many mutations in a single replication, by the formula $m^k/e^{(m-1)\lambda}$, where $k$ is the number of mutations. This is independent of the background mutations rate.

In accordance with the formula above, a small increase in the probability of one mutation increases the probability of a variant-creating jump. Patients taking MOLN are expected to shed the virus in almost equal volumes as untreated patients.

New variants of SARS-COV-2 are created by rare replications with many simultaneous mutations. The frequency of such events increases exponentially by increasing the number of mutations.

Estimates show that MOLN would increase the frequency of sets of 8 mutations by 3,000 times, and sets of 12 mutations by 240,000 times, per virus generation, per person. This does not include recombinations and many other effects which are likely to compound these results. Multiple rounds of replication per person would further increase the threat.

The impact will likely not be detected immediately due to a possible lag between the appearance of a new variant and the necessary changes in external conditions, which lead to its spread.

At least some of the many artificial variants, induced by the MOLN treatment, will likely combine immune escape, higher contagiousness, and higher virulence, just to mention a few. Thus, the wide-spread use of a MOLN for SARS-COV-2 will likely produce mutations unlike anything that has existed in nature or in human history. This would be a gain-of-function experiment, performed on the entire human race.
Introduction

Similar concerns about accelerating global evolution of SARS2 expressed in the comments to the FDA by (Ismagilov 2021) and (Nelson and Otto 2021).

MOLN is a mutagenic drug, which presumably helps body defeat SARS2 by causing lethal mutagenesis (Gordon et al. 2021) (Zhou et al. 2021). “Lethal mutagenesis is the extinction of a viral population by artificially elevating its mutation rate” (Bull et al. 2013). MOLN introduces errors in the coronavirus RNA after proofreading.

In addition to MOLN’s mutagenicity for the virus, it has also been shown to be mutagenic for humans. Trials have also shown that MOLN is carcinogenic in humans and unsuccessful in preventing or treating COVID-19. The initial positive reports presented by Merk were based on only the first part of a trial, with several issues, invalidating the results (Goldstein 2021).

Here, a mutation means a non-synonymous change in an amino acid, except where specifically noted otherwise.

Main

Frequent Misconceptions

The top three mistakes made by doctors (including AMDAC evaluators), regarding Molnupiravir’s action on SARS2:

(1) Likening the variant creating action of MOLN with a resistance to antibiotics.

The evolution of pathogens happens by diversification (or entropy increase), through mutations and natural selection for fitness. Both parts of this process are required. Diversification is usually not noticed, because it is considered constant.

Unlike almost all existing drugs, MOLN increases the rate of mutations (diversification) of SARS2. This increase provides more raw material for natural selection.

This is very different from the mechanisms causing concern with other drugs, like antibiotics. Those drugs might cause development of pathogen strains resistant to that drug – aka the selection of pathogen genotypes that cannot be inhibited by this specific drug. MOLN increases the diversity of SARS2, allowing it to better adapt to all challenges and countermeasures, not just to one drug.

A patient treated with MOLN has more diversified SARS2 RNA, from the very beginning of treatment. Thus, the patient is actively transmitting this diversified SARS2 RNA to others, throughout the entire treatment period. A patient treated with an antibiotic, or another non-mutagenic drug may develop more resistant strain to that particular drug, but only toward the end of the treatment, when the titer and infectivity are low.

(2) Not appreciating the rarity of the dangerous events.

A set of mutations that might become a new variant, happens once per a few million patients. It is therefore unlikely to be detected by sequencing samples from a few hundred patients (as done in Merk’s trial), or by observing the recovery of a few thousand patients - Merk’s trial was performed on only about 1,400 patients. If MOLN causes a dangerous new variant once in about a hundred thousand
patients, Merk’s trial would have completely missed it. However, it would be catastrophic when used on millions of people, as Merk plans to do.

(3) Not understanding that variants are not created by single mutations, but by simultaneously occurring mutation sets. MOLN exponentially increases the frequency of such large mutation sets.

If \( m \) is an increase in the mutation rate and \( k \) is the number of mutations in the set, then the frequency of sets of \( k \) mutations increases \( \sim m^k \). Large mutation sets remain too rare to observe in a small trial of a few hundred, but are guaranteed to happen when MOLN is used on millions of people.

Merck has manufactured and shipped millions of MOLN ‘treatment courses’ all over the world and has licensed it for production in many countries. It also intends to produce 10M ‘treatment courses’ by the end of the year. The Philippines are already using MOLN and heavily promoting it.

Rare events are disregarded as outliers, even when observed. But as explained by the above-described formulas, variant causing mutation sets are “rare” - meaning one in thousands or millions. Even so, out of about one hundred sequenced patients in Merk’s trial, one patient had 7 mutations in the spike protein (FDA CDER Briefing 2021), p. 32. This is very alarming. If such a massive mutation set was found in about less than 150 patients tested, what would happen when it is used on millions? Nevertheless, neither the FDA nor AMDAC looked at this case closely, and they allowed the sponsor to simply dismiss it.

**AMDAC Meeting**

AMDAC is not suitably composed to evaluate global risks. Only one doctor in the AMDAC meeting understood the global risk of MOLN and spoke about it.

MOLN is mutagenic for viruses and for humans. Some AMDAC doctors were confused by that.

All the data presented to AMDAC come from the sponsor (Merck & Ridgeback). There has been no independent testing and no peer review of the data.

Teleconferencing is not a suitable way to conduct meetings of such importance.

**The Benefit of Causing Errors in SARS2**

SARS2 globally benefits from an increased mutation rate, because of the fast-changing conditions necessitating faster adaptation.

RNA mutations (or errors) are necessary for viral evolution. A mutation/error rate that is too low, reduces the natural selection ability of the virus. Experiments with production of artificial antibodies and other synthetic proteins by randomly mutating the DNA have shown that higher rates of mutation/error produced a larger number of useful proteins (Drummond and et al. 2005).

Lethal mutagenesis is a lengthy process. It is unlikely to work on SARS2 after the onset of symptoms, when there are likely only 1-3 generations of the virus, before the virus is cleared, the patient is hospitalized, or both. MOLN does not significantly decrease the SARS2 viral load during that time.
**Numeric Estimates**

**Variants of Concern**

The following Table 1 is useful in making guesses about the sizes of variant-creating mutation sets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variant</th>
<th>First detected</th>
<th>Parent</th>
<th><strong>New Mutations in total</strong></th>
<th>New mutations in S-protein</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Omicron (B.1.1.529)</td>
<td></td>
<td>B.1.1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta (B.1.617.2)</td>
<td>7/14/2020</td>
<td>B.1 (sic)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambda (C.37)</td>
<td>7/31/2020</td>
<td>B.1.1.1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamma (P.1)</td>
<td>4/7/2020</td>
<td>B.1.1.28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta (B.1.351)</td>
<td>2/15/2020</td>
<td>B.1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha (B.1.1.7)</td>
<td>2/7/2020</td>
<td>B.1.1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1 (not a variant)</td>
<td>1/28/2020</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from November 14, 2021. The consensus sequences change occasionally, but not much. Outbreak.info is based on GISAID, which is strongly biased by sampling. It contains mostly SARS2 RNA sequences from North America and Western Europe. There is almost no data from China. Nevertheless, because SARS2 spreads quickly, it is assumed sufficient for rough estimates.

The *New Mutations* column is how many mutations distinguish the variant from its immediate parent in the Pango classification. Reverse mutations can be disregarded because of low probability. Absence of intermediate nodes suggests that intermediate (between the variant and its parent) RNA sequences were either absent or not evolutionary fit. Thus, there likely has been a “leap” from the vicinity of the parent lineage to the “attraction basin” of the VOC. This provides some basis to the estimation of 8-12 mutations.

**Poisson Distribution**

For the mutation frequency $\lambda$, the probability of exactly $k$ mutations in one replication of a virus is described by the Poisson distribution:

$$p(k, \lambda) = \frac{\lambda^k e^{-\lambda}}{k!}$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

When it is increased by a factor of $m$ by a mutagen, the formula becomes:

$$p(k, m\lambda) = \frac{(m\lambda)^k e^{-m\lambda}}{k!}$$

which can be re-written as:

$$p(k, m\lambda) = p(k, \lambda) \times \frac{m^k}{e^{(m-1)\lambda}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)
Thus, the increase in probability of large sets of mutations grows very sharply by $k$.

$\lambda \approx 0.4$, including mutations caused by host editing. Formula (2) is sensitive to $m$ and $k$, but not to $\lambda$. (Zhou et al. 2021) suggests $m = 2.5$, but the assumption that MOLN has above zero therapeutic activity requires $m > 4$. Let’s set $m = 3$ as a reasonable compromise between the two values.

Considering these parameters, as an example, MOLN would increase the frequency of 8 mutations occurring simultaneously by 3,000 times, and the frequency of 12 mutations occurring simultaneously by 240,000 times.

Productive recombination events would further increase this effect. Additionally, other factors are underestimated in this assumption. For example, the concentration of NHC (the active metabolite of MOLN) is variable. Its half-life is 3.3 hours (per (Merck 2021), slide 39), compared to the recommended 12 hours between drug intakes.

**Conclusion**

Because SARS2 spreads so fast, the use of MOLN anywhere threatens people everywhere. It should be stopped immediately.

**Links**

FDA Materials: [https://www.fda.gov/advisory-committees/advisory-committee-calendar/november-30-2021-antimicrobial-drugs-advisory-committee-meeting-announcement-11302021-11302021#event-materials](https://www.fda.gov/advisory-committees/advisory-committee-calendar/november-30-2021-antimicrobial-drugs-advisory-committee-meeting-announcement-11302021-11302021#event-materials)

The video of the AMDAC meeting: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fR9FNSJT64M](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fR9FNSJT64M)

Selected comments from Regulations.gov docket


[https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FDA-2021-N-0758-0040](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FDA-2021-N-0758-0040)

[https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FDA-2021-N-0758-0024](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FDA-2021-N-0758-0024)

[https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FDA-2021-N-0758-0020](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FDA-2021-N-0758-0020)

[https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FDA-2021-N-0758-0017](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FDA-2021-N-0758-0017)

**Reference**


FDA CDER Briefing. FDA Briefing Document. 2021 Nov 26; https://www.fda.gov/media/154418/download


