01/24/2017: Correction to the CAG at War with the USA essay: the first batch of the incriminating CRU emails was released in 2009. Climategate 2.0 was the release of the second batch in 2011. The enemies of America became emboldened after Obama re-election in 2012. The Climate Alarmism Governance started its undeclared war at some time in 2010-2013. End of Correction.
An example of the centralized propagation of the Climate Alarmism Governance (CAG) resolutions is an article, published on MediaMatters, December 31, 2015:
“Resolution #1: I Will Disclose The Fossil Fuel Ties Of Those Attacking Climate And Clean Energy Policies
Resolution #2: I Will Not Provide False Balance On The Science Of Climate Change
Resolution #3: I Will Provide The Climate Change Context When Reporting On Extreme Weather Events
Resolution #4: I Will Compel Presidential Candidates To Discuss Climate Change, And Hold Them Accountable When They Do
Resolution #5: I Will Give Climate Change The Coverage It Deserves”
The resolutions 1-3 obviously compel journalists to publish fake news. But the real shocker is that these resolutions are not personal thoughts, but actual instructions for journalists, the party line. MediaMatters is a mouthpiece of the Center for American Progress, an apparent member of Climintern and an ideological organ of the ruling Demonrat Party. Journalists and publications, following MediaMatters instructions, received public money, generously given away by Obama administration to promote climate alarmism. Obama administration could not punish authors and publications that did not follow MediaMatters instructions directly, so it punished them by proxy, by going after their supporters, advertisers, or funders, frequently in collusion with CAG, foreign political parties and other entities.
From a CAN booklet (CAN stands for the international Climate Action Network), emphasis is mine:
We didn’t have Fossil of the Day back then, but together with USCAN we did an assessment of the national climate plans for each EU, Central and Eastern European country and the US. A national NGO filled in a matrix asking the same 10 questions in each country about what countries were really doing. It was like a shadow report on each country’s plan, probably the best reference on their activity, providing an invaluable overview, the first of its kind. Extremely successful in creating peer pressure on countries, and the UNFCCC Secretariat loved it because they didn’t have the capacity to follow what was happening on the ground in each country. Their review teams used those reports as references.
Oh the drama of Kyoto… I think CAN really helped do the messaging work that set expectations and made it clear that the voluntary approach was not working by itself. It was a key media air war. And of course some of the CAN members that had key networks in the major capitals pushed their governments on various crunch points.
—Alden Meyer, UCS
Sinks issues began to come up well before Kyoto. How to cope with emissions from LULUCF was difficult because of high uncertainty in the estimates of emissions. The biggest impact I probably ever had was circulating a briefing paper that contained a table of uncertainties from the IPCC. The head of the Brazilian delegation and chair of SBSTA waved the paper and told SBSTA, ‘you should all read this.’ It was the NGO position that we didn’t want land use or gases other than carbon dioxide going into Kyoto because we didn’t think you could estimate them really well.
Part of what helped unify everyone was George W. Bush. That helped everyone to say that you’re not the decider on whether Kyoto lives or dies. Japan was a major target – we had flooded the place with these buttons and placards, with the Japanese rising sun, which read ‘Honor Kyoto.’ And it worked. The US was totally isolated, and everyone went on to do the Marrakech Accords. That was another high point, to put pressure on Japan to break with the US and save Kyoto.
—Alden Meyer, UCS
CAN of course played a critical role in working with the EU, South Africa, and other developing countries to craft a strategy on the floor to isolate the US and get them to reverse their position on opposing the Bali Action Plan. John Coequyt was then at Greenpeace USA, and had a friendship with Dave Banks, who was a deputy at the Bush White House’s Council on Environmental Quality. Dave actually used John’s cell phone to get back to the White House so that they could send instructions to the State Department to get them to drop their objection to the Bali Action Plan. There, a personal relationship helped to broker the deal.
—Alden Meyer, UCS
We’ve been somewhat uneven in our public engagement and mobilization. There wasn’t enough of a critical mass, and we needed outside messaging and mobilizing arms. Thus the rationale for launching the Global Campaign for Climate Action in the run-up to Copenhagen. I think, in the wake of Copenhagen, and the bad taste that left in our mouths, you’ve seen many of the bigger groups pull back from the UNFCCC, and fewer believe you can get much value in the international process. To CAN’s credit, both its leadership and Board, recognizes you need a combination of national and international action to have success. And CAN couldn’t afford to pull out of the negotiations, as it’s part of an overall strategy. I think that CAN is still pigeon-holed in a delegate’s mind. It needs to broaden out at the national level and in other fora to do leadership accountability and put pressure on corporations not to side with the fossil fuel industry. In the current strategic planning, there’s a focus on leadership strategies and strengthening the capacity of CAN nodes and key countries to ramp up mobilization in key countries.
—Alden Meyer, UCS
The challenge CAN has, that all of us have, is that the world is so much different from the world of the late 80s when we started. How do we now approach this problem? I think we’re seeing at the United Nations a struggle to figure out what is the path forward. But it’s encouraging that we now have hundreds and hundreds of group working on climate change, that didn’t exist 10 or 15 years ago.
The assertion that not only foot soldiers, but even lieutenants and captains of CAG (Climate Alarmism Governance) might not know for whom they fight seems far-fetched. But the 4th generation of modern warfare, apparently waged against us by CAG, has many features of the pre-modern wars.
The state arose to bring order. And it was successful at that. First internally, then, with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, externally as well. Because with that peace treaty that ends the Thirty Years War, the state says, “from now on, we have a monopoly on war”. Only states can fight war, using state armies, navies, etcetera, with uniforms, and flags, and specialized equipment. All the things we think of defining the very difference between military and civilian. This context is so automatic to us after 350 years that we cannot think of war in any other way.
But the fact of the matter is that through the vast bulk of history and prehistory, many different entities fought wars! Families fought wars— Montague and Capulet— clans fought wars, ethnic groups and races fought wars, religions fought wars, business enterprises fought wars.
(Lind, The Four Generations of Modern War)
In the early feudal period in Europe, a noble owed allegiance only to his lord. This was called vassalage. The lord, other than monarch, owed allegiance to somebody else, and could switch his allegiance under certain circumstances. When called, a vassal was obligated to join the army of his lord, to bring auxiliaries and his own vassals (if he had any), and to fight. The lord did not have to tell his vassals whether he was fighting for somebody else, how many levels of command are above him, or who was on the top in the chain of command. Medieval mercenaries knew even less for whom or for what they were fighting. Notorious climate alarmists and certain public officials are more like the mercenaries than the nobles.