Attached is a very important letter regarding Jan 6 from a high-ranking Capitol Police officer. The letter, dated by September 28, 2021, describes some events behind Capitol police actions on January 5-6, 2021, unknown to the public and perhaps even to Congressional Republicans. The letter was uploaded by Politico to Scribd, as non-text PDF with low quality OCR, which makes it hard to search or cite. MSM covered this letter for a few days in October 2021 and then stopped. USCP-officer-letter-J6-OCR-human.pdf is a text PDF copy of this letter, after human assisted OCR and page matching for the ease of citing. It is in the public domain.
According to the letter, USCP Yogananda Pittman and Sean Gallagher (together, P&G) were the main culprits in the Capitol police failures on January 6. The letter states the following about these two:
- They failed to share the most important intelligence with USCP commanders
- They were in the command center and acted as USCP force commanders (the Area Command) on the January 6, but did nothing to help the officers who were fighting the intruders
- They lied to Congress about Jan 6 events
- Prior to Jan 6, they were promoted to their high-ranking positions under pressure by Congressional members, despite their lack of the operational experience
- After Jan 6, they have been promoted despite their misconduct on and before that day
The UCPS officer who authored of the letter (the whistleblower) was under the impression that those who attacked the Capitol on Jan6 were associated with a pro-Trump group.
Yogananda Pittman was the Assistant Chief for Protective and Intelligence Operations since October 2019. “In that role, she is responsible for all operations concerning the safety and security of the U.S. Capitol, Members of Congress, staff and visitors to include threat detection and prevention as well as the physical security systems throughout the Capitol Complex.”
The letter’s descriptions of Pittman and Gallagher’s actions, both in preparation for and on Jan 6, suggest that their failures were not mistakes or incompetence, but intentional. Their subsequent promotions, after completely failing to protect the Capitol, also suggests that they were rewarded for their actions, by the Congressional Democrat leaders who came to power after January 6. While many high-ranking USPC officers were asked to resign, Pittman and Gallagher were promoted, until the vote of no confidence by the Capitol Police union. Below are some excerpts from the officer’s letter.
Bold emphasis was added by me. Underlining is in the original. Except for the lists, each paragraph is a separate quote.
IIAD stands for the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division of USCP. Usually abbreviated as IICD.
The Anonymous USCP Officer J6 Letter, September 28, 2021, Selected Quotes
This document is filed as a whistle-blower and focuses on two primary topics. One is the failures of Chiefs Pittman and Gallagher of the USCP leading up to, on and after January 6th. The second is the topic of the failed honesty of the congressional community with the members of the USCP.
As honor and honesty are derived from the same Latin root, Honeste, I submit that you can’t [have] honor without honesty. … I assert that the truth of the leadership/intelligence failures of the 6lh is purposefully not being delivered to the officers and public. I assert that that those that failed so epically are purposefully not being held accountable. Also, those that did perform at a high-level are being marginalized so as not to highlight the failures of those two chiefs [P&G]. … most everyone knows the truth about the intelligence failure and who is to blame. It is offensive for congressional entities to think it is not obvious to most of the members of the Department.
Though the Senate report revealed some of the lies, it stopped just short of calling the acting chief [Pittman, at that time – LG] a liar, but they knew she did. Moreover, the fact that most other entities have published some information that is demonstrably inaccurate, incomplete and/or failed to publish corroborated information is a shameful ruse on the members of the USCP. This concerted effort to protect the two members of the Department without question the most responsible for the tragic events of January 6fh is repulsive. Protecting their failures and the failures of others at the cost of the esteem of every other commander of the Department is unconscionable. To allow these two to hide within a cloak that the “Department failed” has the overt stench of politics unlike anything I saw in my 31-years on the Hill. …
Since January 6th, I have attempted to ensure accountability for those responsible for the January 6th failure. … After almost 6 months, I was finally interviewed for the first and only time for almost two hours by the OIG… I then read OIG Report #5 on Command and Control and realized nothing was included. The information I provided, corroborated by others, about the failures of Pittman and Gallagher on the 6th was absent.
There were Commanders that led and fought with such bravery and resolve that can only be described in words that are reserved for few people in history such as “epically” and “heroically”. … Eric Waldow, Thomas Loyd and many others. … He [Thomas Loyd] was easily the USCP official most responsible for re-securing the Capitol building and it seemed like he was everywhere at once restoring order and security. … I submit the deliberate failure to acknowledge the efforts of these two heroes and others was purposefully to ensure the failures of Pittman and Gallagher were not highlighted. It also calls into question why these two, without any investigation, were named to lead the Agency even though they failed every member of the Department.
It is obvious that the [Democrat-dominated] congressional community has purposefully failed to provide the truth to the members of the USCP that fought so valiantly to protect them on the 6th.
Specific Assertions against P&G
- Failure to Supervise:
- … This was 100% an intelligence failure. The intelligence possessed, if distributed, would have provided the Department with understanding of the magnitude and threat to be faced. … It would have provided the intelligence needed to change the posture of the Agency to include shutting doors and deploying hard gear and more less than lethal weapons. These two had the intelligence information needed (21-TD-159 and other reports) but never shared it with the rest of the Department, particularly those commanders with real operational experience.
- Failing to investigate all officials on the Department that failed to take any acceptable level of action on the 6th. This includes officials that failed to even respond. …
- These officials [P&G] were the only officials that had all the intelligence information for the 6th.
- … The fact that IIAD was provided information that Stop the Steal was surrounding the Capitol from every side by separate entities was never relayed to operational commanders. This piece of intelligence like the 21-TD-159 document was also game changing information that was never reported. In fact, the IIAD reported the opposite to commanders… [whether this piece of intelligence was correct or not is out of the scope; every commanding officer had to receive the same information – LG]
- Per the OIG, the IIAD commander failed in many aspects of their duties as outlined in policy. …
- Ultimately, the IIAD, that they supervised, produced approximately 50 pages of documents in a dozen plus reports reference the demonstrations on the 6th. … In 50 pages, there was one paragraph tacked on page 15 of one document that vaguely spoke of the target of the demonstration being Congress this time. The remaining 99% of the 50 pages … repeated the chances of any police action were “unlikely or remote”. … For what it is worth, in my 31 years, I have never known the Congress to NOT be the target of a demonstration group. This is true whether the issue is DACA, Health Care or Confirmation Hearings. The target is always Congress.
- Performance of Duty – for failure to take appropriate action in a police emergency. This is the most egregious failure I have seen by an official in my career. As the area commander:
- These two [P&G] failed to take appropriate action which directly contributed to the deaths and wounding of officers and civilians. In the command center, they simply watched mostly with their hands in their laps. They did not try to help or assist as officers and officials were literally fighting for each other, their lives and the Congress. These two instead, while officers were being injured, elected to do nothing, lie and attempt to profit professionally. They chose to watch, as one non USCP witness stated “like two bumps on a log”, make calls and start to blame everyone for their failures. … Thanks to the Senate Report, we now know that they were the ones that failed the planning and operational components of the Department, every officer and the Congress.
- False Statement to Congress 18 USC 1001 – Amongst other statements testified to in the Senate Rules Committee report Pittman states that the Department sent the single most critical intelligence report, 21-TD-159, to “Command staff to include assistant chiefs and deputy chiefs” (Footnote 232). This is unconditionally false. It was never sent or shared. It also was never used to update any intelligence brief forwarded to the commanders. …
- Conduct Unbecoming – In that they have lied to the Congress, the officers and officials of this Department. They have had directed other officials to champion their lies…
The allegations are not mine alone but corroborated by the completed investigations by the OIG, Senate and other witnesses on the Department. Reference:
- Failure to Supervise – as Assistant Chief Pittman Chief, Chief of Protective and Intelligence Operations and Deputy Chief Gallagher, Commander of Protective Services Bureau. These two are the top two commanders of the USCP Intelligence Operations as confirmed by the U.S. Senate Report (Page 37) failed the entire Department as stated in multiple reports. Their specific failures include:
- “USCP’s intelligence components failed to convey the full scope of threat information they possessed. …” (Examining the USCP Capitol Attack, Senate Report)
- “USCP’s lead intelligence component—the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (“IIAD”)—was aware of the potential for violence. … Yet, IIAD failed to fully incorporate this information … critical information regarding threats of violence was not shared with USCP’s own officers and other law enforcement partners.” (Examining the USCP Capitol Attack, Senate Report)
- ” On January 5, an employee in a separate USCP intelligence-related component received information from the FBI’s Norfolk Field Office regarding online discussions of violence directed at Congress… This report, similar to other information received by IIAD, was never distributed to IIAD or USCP leadership before January 6.” (Examining the USCP Capitol Attack, Senate Report) [Reliability of information sourced from the social media is out of the scope here – LG]
- Daily reports leading up to and on the 6th stated the chance of any civil disobedience was “REMOTE” or “Unlikely”.
- Performance of Duty – for failure to take appropriate action in a police emergency. As the area commanders:
- These two sat at the head of the Dias, position of command, in the Command Center next to MPD. For most of my time in the Command Center they were the two highest ranking persons in the room and sat in the position of authority. The observation by many where they did nothing to help. …
- They [P&G] provided no direction or assistance to incident commanders in any fashion. They stated that the[y] directed DPD [Dignitary Protection Division] evacuations. … [USCP had to defend Representatives and Senators in their Chambers first. Only if the defense fails, the option of evacuation should have been offered – LG].
- What I observed was them mostly sitting there, blankly looking at the TV screens showing real time footage of officers and officials fighting for the Congress and their lives. This observation of their inaction was reported and corroborated by other officials and non-USCP entities. Even the IG investigator stated at one time during my interview that he was starting to wonder what they were doing.
- It is my allegation that these two with intent and malice opted to not try and assist the officers and officials, blame others for the failures, and chose to try and use this event for their own personal promotions. …
- False Statement to Congress 18 USC 1001
- Specific to Investigative Research and Intelligence Report, 21-TD-159 (December 21, 2020):
- According to Ms. Pittman, this report (2I-TD-159) was distributed only to “command staff,” including the deputy chiefs and assistant chiefs. (Pittman Interview to Committee on April 20, 2021). This is a False Statement to Congress 18 USC 1001. Report 21-TD-159 was NEVER distributed to command staff including deputy chiefs and assistant chiefs as testified to the Senate Rules Committee. As this information was never incorporated into any report then these two were the only ones that knew.
- This document was incredibly important and damning to Assistant Chief Pittman and the Deputy Chief Gallagher … The command staff would have NEVER known they were lied about if it wasn’t for the work of the U.S. Senate.
- The “TD” report was never heard of by any member of the executive management team other than Pittman and Gallagher. They were the ones that implemented this numbering system to track internal documents for their command unbeknownst to other commanders.
- In the USCP provided timeline has many false statements used to obscure their full responsibility and deflect blame to every other commander for their failures. …
It is my opinion that these two enjoyed enough political favors to get unmerited promotions and assignments without the operational experience … Again, after the 6th, they enjoyed enough political favor for their lies to be acted on and to be immediately placed in charge of the Department.
My 31 years of experience leads me to the opinion is that the controlling congressional entities that pushed them forward in the first place and are protecting them are doing it for a several reasons. First, they seek to control the USCP’s message reference January 6th. … Second, it is a poor reflection on the congressional leadership and those key staffers for championing the promotions of inexperienced and incapable leaders that directly led to the events of the 6th. Third, it Is immensely embarrassing to the congressional leadership and staff that they selected the two individuals most responsible for the 6th to lead the Department after the 6th. … Finally, it is a blemish upon the Congress that these actions have led to the continued mass resignation of exemplary and experienced officials and officers that don’t have faith in the character or competency of these two people. They can promote whoever they like but you can’t replace the real operational experience that has been lost.